Ever since the world has embarked on the path of development, energy security has become an essential aspect of national security. National security does not solely pertain to protection against physical, violent threats. Broadly, it can be said that national security is the protection of the varied interests of the state. It is inclusive of economic security, cybersecurity, political security, energy security, and so on. According to the International Energy Agency, energy security can be defined as “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price” (IEA.Org). It is crucial to understand that different countries would perceive energy security differently depending on whether they import or export it. Countries that import energy security are secure if they have “reliable supplies of ample energy, affordable prices, a diversity of producers, and adequate infrastructure to transport oil and gas” (Orttung, 212). These are India, China, United States, United Kingdom. Countries that export energy security would define it as access to “high prices and stable demand, diversity of customers, maximum control, obtaining sufficient domestic or foreign investment to maintain or increase output, and ensuring that their economies are sufficiently diversified so that they are not reliant on fluctuating energy commodity prices” (Orttung, 212). The Middle East, Venezuela and Russia, in possession of the world’s largest oil fields, would fall under this category.
It would not be wrong to claim that cheap and efficient energy resources are a primary interest for any nation. In the case of fossil fuels, the uneven distribution of these could cause anxieties and insecure energy systems. Moreover, agents that control or could potentially alter the steady supply of these resources would threaten the energy security of the nation. These agents could be human-made or natural disasters, competition over resources, political instability or manipulation, etc. The United States, for example, has been actively involved in the middle east to secure Iranian and Persian oil reserves and thereby its energy systems. There is no doubt that oil has driven powerful nations like the United States to various extents and with new developing countries in the arena, the competition has only increased in the fight for access to these exhaustible resources.
Similarly, the need to ensure its energy security has driven China to undertake a major project referred to as the Belt and Road initiative. It aims to connect China overland to various nations with access to the sea. The purpose is to build a multitude of options for its oil supply as opposed to relying on the most commonly used shipping route passing through a significant bottleneck in the Indian Ocean. While energy security is the primary goal, the Belt and Road Initiative also aims to provide better trade opportunities for China in its conquest for global supremacy through control over the global economy. The purpose of this paper is to trace China’s Malacca dilemma in this regard and the initiatives it has taken to diversify its methods of importing crude oil.
Case Study- The Malacca Dilemma: A hindrance to Chinese Ambitions in the 21st Century
China’s growing industrial sector is, no doubt, heavily reliant on foreign oil. As of 2017, China became the largest importer of crude oil. Around 70% of the country’s energy resources are imported, and the figures are only increasing (Singh). China imports its energy mainly from the Middle East and Angola. 80% of the foreign oil shipped to China passes through the Malacca Strait--a channel between the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra (Singh). Access to this strait is crucial to the economies of Asian countries such as China, Thailand, India, South Korea, and Japan, since it is the primary connection between the Indian and Pacific Ocean, the Andaman and South China sea. The Malacca Strait is one of three such channels that become passages for its oil shipments. The Sunda Strait’s shallow and narrow character makes it rather unsuitable for larger vessels, and the Lombok Strait is longer and hence financially inefficient. These drawbacks of its other two shipping passages force China to rely chiefly on the Malacca Strait.
Not only are there concerns about piracy, but this strait could be used as a choke-point for China in case of a conflict, cutting it off from a vital energy corridor. China’s heavy reliance on these straits is indeed a weakness and a potential threat to its energy security. Singapore, “a US ally that frequently participates in US naval drills, located at the mouth of the strait’s eastern opening, the Strait of Malacca becomes a natural strategic choke-point” (Singh). Moreover, Chinese thinker Zeng Fenggang has argued that “India will seek to develop a capability to guard the straits of Malacca in peacetime and blockade it during wartime” (Potter).
Recognizing this threat to its energy security, China has taken various initiatives to diversify its energy imports. The Kazakhstan-China pipeline is one such method to counter these threats. The 2800 kilometre long pipeline connects refineries in Xinjiang, China to oil fields in West Kazakhstan. Another such pipeline is the “Myanmar-Yunnan Pipelines which siphons oil and gas from the Bay of Bengal to the Kunming region of China, avoiding the Malacca Strait for Burmese oil imports” (Singh). However, the most efficient alternative to the use of the Malacca strait is the Gwadar-Xinjiang pipeline--part of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The CPEC is an initiative by China to build and restore infrastructure in Pakistan to facilitate better trade with not only Pakistan but other countries of the region. Under its Belts and Roads Initiative (BRI), China has invested significantly in various infrastructural projects in Pakistan. The purpose of the BRI is to connect China, through the medium of railroads and other projects related to trade and shipping, particularly energy, to other countries. This project commenced in 2013, intending to connect China with 70 countries that are crucial for trade. The case study highlights that the project in Gwadar has come to be known as the crown jewel of China’s string of pearls--Chinese network on the Indian Ocean. This port would allow China to avoid going through the Malacca Strait altogether. In this case, shipping tankers from the middle east would “simply dock at Gwadar where the oil would be extracted and further transported to China through a series of pipelines” (Singh). In addition to that, this pipeline could also be linked to the Iran-Pakistan pipeline, further ensuring China’s energy security. The Gwadar-Pakistan pipeline would cover a smaller distance of 3000 kilometres compared to the 12,000 kilometres covered while importing oil through the Malacca Strait. However, it would be more costly to transport oil over land than oversea. Regardless, if China were to lose access to the Malacca Strait in case of a conflict, it could rely on this project in the future.
However, the Gwadar-Xinjiang pipeline is still underway with 2025-2030 as estimated years of completion. Moreover, in comparison to the quantity of oil imported via the Malacca Strait (6.5 million barrels/day) the Kazakhstan-China pipeline (400,000 barrels/day) and Myanmar-Yunnan (420,000 barrels/day) are inefficient, to say the least (Singh). Therefore, until the much-awaited Gwadar-Xinjiang pipeline of the CPEC materializes, China will continue to be heavily reliant on the Malacca Strait and face insecurity in its energy systems to some extent.
While the case study highlights that these conflicts are abstract, it is crucial to note that most threats when it comes to energy security or even national security at large, are perceived, and solutions must be ready before the threats manifest. In today’s day, industrialization is at the center of the economies of countries that aim to become developed. The competition for access to unevenly distributed and exhaustible sources of energy is only increasing. Thus, it has become crucial for countries to perceive conflicts and threats and secure their energy systems. The importance of being secure when it comes to energy sources does not seem to be diminishing soon. Renewable resources such as wind energy, solar energy, biomass, geothermal heat, etc., are surely gaining popularity. However, due to the requirement of great infrastructural prowess, these sources are not efficient enough to alleviate the immense pressure on fossil fuels. Nevertheless, when these hurdles are overcome, conclusions regarding energy security must be reviewed with newer questions such as the differential impact of these replenish-able and clean sources of energy (if any) on the energy security of the countries that import it as opposed to those that export it.
Works Cited
Orttung Robert W. ‘ Energy Security’ Routledge Handbook of Security Studies. Routledge.
“The Importance of the Straits of Malacca.” E, www.e-ir.info/2012/09/07/the-importance-of-the-straits-of-malacca/.
Singh, Ana. Berkeley Political Review, 26 Aug. 2019, bpr.berkeley.edu/2019/08/26/the-
malacca-dilemma-a-hindrance-to-chinese-ambitions-in-the-21st-century/.
Note: This paper was originally written for a course on Critical Concepts in Peace and Security (Prof. Avinash Godbole), O P Jindal Global University, Sonepat, Haryana
Naaz Narang
(Co-owner EPGSC)
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