Environment security is a concept that is increasingly gaining prominence in the dialogue on both national and international security. The AC/UNU Millennium Project defines environmental security as “the relative public safety from environmental dangers caused by natural or human processes due to ignorance, accident, mismanagement or design and originating within or across national borders” (Zurlini, Müller 4). Issues of environmental security can pose threats not just to the environment itself but also on the dependent population. Protecting the access to certain resources such as air and water is, therefore, gradually becoming a security priority for many nations across the world. Historically, the discussions surrounding national and international security have been restricted to direct threats to the state. However, these priorities are undergoing an expansion to include non-traditional and transnational ideas of threat such as cyberterrorism, cyberwarfare, and environmental security issues (Shaver, Yozell 5). Clashing conventional security interests are one of the many reasons behind strained relations between nations (5). Similarly, colliding environmental security issues can create a sense of insecurity among nations and can harm sustained efforts at maintaining peace. This essay, through the example of the Afghanistan-Iran transboundary water dispute, will illustrate how conflicting environmental security interests can be detrimental to the peace-making process and can create disputes even between countries which are making sincere efforts to maintain cordial relations. Afghanistan is a landlocked country due to which several of its river basins are shared by neighbouring countries. The sharing of water among countries has always been a contentious issue and Afghanistan is no exception. Two of the major river basins shared in by Afghanistan are the Helmand River Basin and the Harirud-Murghab River Basin, with Iran. While Afghanistan and Iran have not had any threatening territorial disputes (Aman 1), the sharing of these two river basins is creating a transboundary water dispute between the two. Both Iran and Afghanistan are highly reliant on these two river basins especially considering the fact that both countries suffer from droughts, climate change, and lack of proper water management (Houk). Both countries use the water harnessed from the Helmand River Basin for irrigated agriculture. The river basin also plays a very crucial role in sustaining biodiversity and wildlife in the Hamun wetlands. Similarly, about 5 million people in total are reliant on the Harirud-Murghab River Basin (Dehgan et al 3). However, due to the dispute, neither of the countries have been able to use the river basin to their fullest potential. Moreover, the dispute is creating tensions in their bilateral relations. After three decades of war, the existing water infrastructure in Afghanistan has essentially eroded. Moreover, due to the long-drawn-out wars, Afghanistan does not in itself have the ability or wherewithal to fully exploit the river basins. This has created a water deficit in the country. This water deficit has had serious repercussions such as food insecurity, increased unemployment, increased illicit production of opium poppy, among others (Houk). Thus, infrastructural development and water management are crucial aspects of development for the Afghan Government. The country has now set out on a journey of bolstering agriculture by building irrigation canals and dams on the Helmand and Harirud-Murghab River Basins under US-supported plans (King, Sturtewagen 7). These plans also include projects like the Kamal Khan Dam on the Helmand River and the Salma Dam on the Harirud-Murghab River. While these projects are going to make great strides in improving Afghanistan’s socio-economic condition, the country’s efforts to use the shared river basins can have serious reverberating effects for Iran’s eastern provinces (Houk). About one million Iranians rely on the Helmand River Basin and 3.4 million Iranians rely on the Harirud-Murghab River Basin for drinking, crop irrigation, and even moderating the climate. However, the dams that Afghanistan is constructing on the upstream portion of both the river basins could potentially reduce the flow of water downstream, in Iran. Iran, hence, feels threatened by Afghanistan’s developmental projects. Moreover, the construction of hydro-electric power plants upstream would imply that Afghanistan would rely even more on Iran’s energy. This would be extremely problematic, for Iran itself is faced with challenges of droughts, climate change, and a lack of electricity. Moreover, this could create food and water scarcity, and increase unemployment and instability. Exacerbating their plight is the fact that Iran is already having to deal with the challenges of drug trafficking, potential Sunni militancy, the inflow of refugees from Afghanistan, and restive minority populations (Dehgan et al 4). Therefore, Iran’s water security concerns seem legitimate and real. These conflicting interests are adding strain to the Afghanistan-Iran relationship. The two countries have tried to come to a resolution regarding the water dispute but there has not been a substantial breakthrough. Negotiations over the Helmand River have been in the works since the 1870s when the two countries were still under British rule. In 1939, Reza Shah Pahlavi’s Iranian Government and Mohammad Zahir Shah’s Afghan Government signed a water treaty on the sharing of the Helmand River but Afghanistan never ratified it (Aman 1). Then again in 1948, there was another attempt to negotiate the sharing of the river basin. A three-person commission was set up by both countries to look into the matter and suggest a settlement. The report came in February 1951, recommending an amount of twenty-two cubic metre of the Helmand waters per second. Iran, however, rejected this settlement for it wanted a larger share. In 1973, however, Amir Abbas Hoveida, the then Iranian Prime Minister, and Mohammad Musa Shafiq, the then Afghan Prime Minister, signed a treaty agreeing to the aforementioned allocation. However, an amendment was made providing Iran with the option of buying an additional four cubic metres per second in “normal” water years in return for providing Afghanistan easier access to the Bandar Abbas and Chabahar ports. This treaty too was never ratified and fully implemented due to domestic political unrest in both the countries. The treaty has also been criticised by many researchers as being inadequate when it comes to ensuring sustainable transboundary water resources management and development (2). Despite efforts to settle the water dispute between the two countries, tensions still persist. A pattern of reluctance on the part of Afghanistan can be observed when it comes to negotiations. Iran has displayed readiness for engaging in more bilateral and trilateral agreements with Afghanistan over the issue of transboundary river basins. However, Afghanistan has not shown much enthusiasm. In fact, it seems that it is a little hesitant in engaging in such agreements. Matthew King and Benjamin Sturtewagen believe that Afghanistan’s reluctance in pursuing regional cooperation could stem from its “weak bargaining position” (King, Sturtewagen 10). Three decades of war in Afghanistan has resulted in diminished technical capabilities as well as poor hydro-meteorological data in comparison to its neighbours (Houk). Moreover, Afghanistan is currently in a post-conflict reconstruction period. At a time like this, it is conceivable as to why Afghanistan would not be very willing to engage in accords and agreements which limit its access to water sources. Many accusations have also been levied by both countries. While on the one hand, Afghan officials have accused Iran of carrying out dam-related attacks in order to sabotage the construction to retain its access to the river basins, Iran has made an even more serious accusation of Afghanistan using water as political leverage so as to exert pressure on Iran for improvements in its treatment of Afghan refugees (Aman 4). This back and forth of accusation brilliantly exemplifies how easy it is to politicise environmental issues and turn them into political tools to use them to tip the scales in one’s favour. Moreover, they serve as a source of fermenting hostility and stress between states. The transboundary water dispute between Afghanistan and Iran does not seem to be nearing a solution. Tensions are brewing and this may have spill over effects on the relations between the two countries. It is clear that issues of environmental security, such as that of water, are directly related to regional security and therefore, have international implications. There is a need to recognise the profound impact environmental disputes and/or conflicts can have on matters of foreign policy and international affairs. In the case of Afghanistan and Iran, the two are at loggerheads over this issue despite the fact that both are sincerely interested in maintaining an overarching peace in the area. It is evident that there is a growing role of environmental security issues in creating destabilisation, insecurity and conflict across nations. Therefore, it is imperative to incorporate environmental considerations in the dialogue regarding international relations and foreign policy, especially when it comes to security.
Works Cited
Aman, Fatemah. “Water Dispute Escalating between Iran and Afghanistan.” Atlantic Council, Atlantic Council South Asia Center, Aug. 2016, www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Water_Dispute_Escalating_between_Iran_and_Afghanistan_web_0830.pdf. Accessed 21 August 2020.
Dehgan, Alex, Jean, Laura, and Mirzaee, Mehdi. “Water Security and Scarcity: Potential Destabilization in Western Afghanistan and Iranian Sistan and Baluchestan due to Transboundary Water Conflicts” ResearchGate, ResearchGate, Aug. 2011, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328249286_Water_Security_and_Scarcity_ Potential_Destabilization_in_Western_Afghanistan_and_Iranian_Sistan_and_Baluche stan_due_to_Transboundary_Water_Conflicts. Accessed 21 August 2020.
Houk, Andrew. “Transboundary Water Sharing: Iran and Afghanistan • Stimson Center.” Stimson Center, Stimson Center, 2 Feb. 2020, www.stimson.org/2011/transboundary-water-sharing-iran-and-afghanistan-0/. Accessed 20 August 2020.
King, Matthew, and Benjamin Sturtewagen. “Making the Most of Afghanistan’s River Basins Opportunities for Regional Cooperation.” EastWest Institute, EastWest Institute, Feb. 2010, www.files.ethz.ch/isn/113057/2010-02_Making-the-most-of-Afghanistans.pdf. Accessed 22 August.
Shaver, Amanda, and Sally Yozell. Environmental Security. Stimson Center, 2018, pp. 5– 5, Casting a Wider Net: The Security Implications Of Illegal, Unreported, And Unregulated Fishing, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep15848.6. Accessed 22 August 2020.
Zurlini, Giovanni, and Müller, Felix. “Environmental Security” ResearchGate, ResearchGate, Dec. 2008, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235698902_Environmental_Security. Accessed 21 August 2020.
Note: This paper was originally written for a course on Critical Concepts in Peace and Security (Prof. Avinash Godbole), O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonepat, Haryana
Sakshi Verman
Co-Owner (EPGSC)
Very well researched! Love your take on this :)