Since its very birth, Pakistan has tried time and again to seize Kashmir and 'reunite' the Kashmiris with their Muslim brothers in Pakistan, their so-called 'original homeland'. Gaining control of Kashmir has been on their agenda very overtly ever since the dust from the storm that was the India-Pakistan partition has settled. Months after gaining independence, two to be exact, the Pakistan army launched Operation Gulmarg in October 1947. This was the first of its many unsuccessful operations. In 1965 Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar with the same agenda. These operations are among many others that attempt to gain control over Kashmir through deceitful and treacherous tactics. In the 1980s, after quite the dry spell, Pakistan reverted to these tactics and launched Operation Topac.
Pakistan identifies Kashmir as a Muslim state and due to its Two-Nation policy, believes it should ideally be a part of Pakistan. Operating on this belief, Pakistan through Operation Topac has been engaging in state-sponsored cross border terrorism in Kashmir. Operation Topac had close historical ties with the Cold War. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the CIA sought to create a global Islamist Jihad to fight Soviet troops. It united young Muslims all over the world for this cause and funded the creation of Mujahideen fighters. These funds and weapons were supplied through the Pakistan army and the ISI. It was then that Pakistan army and its generals saw the opportunity to unlawfully divert this new-found expertise and weaponry to the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in order to encourage “insurgency” and terrorism. This would have allowed Pakistan to weaken India's hold over Kashmir while being easy on the pocket and not overtly associated with the Pakistan army and the ISI. This came to be known as operation Topac and was conceived by General Zia-Ul-Haq, former Pakistani President.
The aim was also to seek revenge for liberating East Pakistan. The Pakistani Army and ISI sought to redirect the Global Jihad created by the CIA in Afghanistan to Kashmir. They have been training Kashmiri youth in camps run by the ISI near the LOC. Moreover, they have also been creating and running various "India -centric militant organizations like Hizb-ul-Mujahedeen, Hizb-ul-Islam, Allah Tigers, Al-Umar Mujahedeen, Harkat-ul-Ansar and Jamaat-e-Islami, Hurriyat Conference, instigating and directing an “insurgency” in J&K, and undertaking terrorist-acts in the state and the rest of India" (Campose). Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, other Pakistan based terrorist groups, have also been created by the ISI. It must be noted that Pakistan has used every front, religious or political, to radicalize the population and create this threat. They have nurtured terrorist organizations that are based in Pakistan with a Kashmiri leadership to cause "strategic-fatigue" (Chatterjee, 1). The aim is to "engage the Indian armed forces in counter-terrorism or low-intensity conflict, thereby degrading India's conventional force prowess. Thus, it not only makes India pay a military price but also an economic price" (Chatterjee, 1). This operation encourages not only local Jihadists but also directs Afghan Jihadists under the belief that infidels are oppressing the Muslim minority. There are striking differences between how local and foreign militants operate. While Kashmiri jihadists would operate from more considerable distances of 100 meters, the foreign, religious militants would operate from 30 metres and engage in guerrilla warfare with the Indian Army.
The Indian government has adopted a three-pronged approach to the threat of terrorism within Kashmir. One part of this three-pronged approach is to counter the cross-border terrorism as opposed to combating/waging war against it. In 1989, security forces received orders for "direct liquidation of the insurgents and their support base within Kashmir and the elimination of support of all kinds, especially of the influx of the armed insurgents, from sources outside the state" (Chatterjee, 2). At that point, the government did not consider the Army as appropriate to respond to this threat. However, the Security forces, BSF and CRPF are not trained to conduct counter-terrorism operations; they failed miserably to control this threat. Due to their failure, the government had to hand this responsibility to the Army.
This added duty to tackle cross-border terrorism presented the potential to deplete the Army's capabilities to carry out its primary objective--"safeguard the territorial integrity of the nation" (Chatterjee, 2). Strategies, techniques, and capabilities that are suited for dealing with internal security breaches are utterly different from those required to carry out the Army's various other duties. Terrorists employ strategies such as kidnappings, hijacking, assassinations, etc. Moreover, there are no clear cut war-zones or binding laws when it comes to terrorist activities. But, it had become clear that physical domination in Kashmir, wherein the locals themselves would extend support to the militants, was crucial. If the Army were to tackle this threat, it would have diverted from their role of guarding the LOC and LAC. Therefore, to counter-terrorism and tackle the internal security threats in Kashmir, a special force had to be raised. For this purpose, the Rashtriya Rifles was established in 1990 by the Army and funded by the Ministry of defense. It allows the Indian Army to tackle the threat created by Pakistan without their granting success to their strategy of “strategic fatigue.” The Rashtriya Rifles is essentially a “paramilitary force” that is composed of soldiers from all arms. One half of it is composed of infantry alone, and the rest of the strength is supplied from other branches of the Army. The officers and soldiers of the Rashtriya Rifles are all trained in various tactics and use of weaponry. The Rashtriya Rifles is a buffer force that carries out counter-terrorism operations and also aids the Indian Army during conflicts such as Kargil. Not only does it extend support in that manner, but it also makes sure that roads and communication are not disrupted, and landmines are offset. The Rashtriya Rifles are deployed in the rural and urban areas of Jammu and Kashmir that are considered 'disturbed areas'.
They face several challenges ranging from difficult terrain to locals' support for militants. They also needed to be able to distinguish between locals and militants with no scope of error. In addition, they need to garner support from the locals as well and eliminate anti-national sentiments. Moreover, they have to apply different urban warfare strategies in urban areas such as Srinagar and separate rural warfare strategies in rural areas. Despite these challenges, the Rashtriya Rifles has carried out its duty in a manner that has not only deterred militants to a certain extent but also allowed the rest of the Indian Army to conduct its counter-infiltration operations with minimal disruption.
The Rashtriya Rifles is recognized as the world's largest and most successful counter-insurgency force that has played a key role in battling Pakistan's proxy war in Kashmir. However, while insurgents may pose a threat, the mechanism employed is terrorism. Hence, the Rashtriya Rifles was shaped to be a counter-terrorism force. This is suggested by the very nature of these operations since they do not combat but campaign against the threats. Counter-terrorism is only a crucial aspect of counter-insurgency. Counter-terrorism is focused on understanding tactics of terrorism, and employing strategies to suitably respond to the physical threat. On the other hand, counter-insurgency also includes other methods such as responses to political violence. Moreover, the Rashtriya Rifles role is also confused by the civilian world as anti-terrorism as opposed to counter-terrorism. This is problematic since anti-terrorism is a defensive mechanism while counter-terrorism includes offensive strategies in dealing with the threat of terrorism.
The case study by Debalina Chatterjee presented through this paper wonderfully captures the essence of the threat and the response to it by the Indian government. However, it lacks sufficient information on the historical background of the threat and how it materialized. The case study by Lt. Gen. Philip Campose was used to present the relevant information in this paper.
Moreover, it also makes the mistake of confusing the Rashtriya Rifles as a paramilitary force. While at its inception it was supposed to be a paramilitary force akin to BSF and CRPF under the Home ministry, it eventually did not materialize that way. The author claims that the RR is confused with the Indian Army and that diminishes its individuality. In reality, the RR is a battalion under the army much like any other composed completely of Indian Army soldiers and officers. These officers and soldiers are very much bound to the Army Act, just like those of the other battalions of the Army. It is also funded by the Ministry of defense, unlike the BSF and CRPF that are funded by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Hence, there is no room for confusing it with the Army considering it is a part of it. Moreover, Chatterjee claims that RR does not receive enough recognition for their success. However, the numerous honors bestowed upon this battalion would disagree with that claim. In fact, the RR continues to be the most decorated battalion of the Indian Army. The case studies presented in this paper err on another front; they use the word insurgency and terrorism interchangeably. The threat in Kashmir is not an insurgency at all considering it was initiated and continues to be supported externally by Pakistan. Before this threat emanated, the population of Kashmir was in fact a moderate form of Sufism. It was the Global Jihadist, diverted to Kashmir by Pakistan, that sought to radicalize the population and instill the belief of being ruled by infidels as unacceptable. The Rashtriya Rifles is a short-term solution to control terrorism while a political solution is reached between the two countries which would, hopefully, eradicate the threat altogether.
Work Cited
Campose, Philip. “'Operation Topac': The Continuing Stimulus behind Pakistan Army's
Anti-India Perfidy.” Indian Defence Review,
Chatterjee, Debalina. “RASHTRIYA RIFLES IN KASHMIR: INDIA’S
COUNTER-TERRORIST FORCE” AIR POWER Journal Vol. 7 No. 1, SPRING 2012
(January-March) https://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/RR
Pratt, Simon. “What Is the Difference between Counter-Insurgency and
Counter-Terrorism?” E,
Note: This paper was originally written for a course on Critical Concepts in Peace and Security (Prof. Avinash Godbole), O P Jindal University, Sonepat, Haryana
Naaz Narang
(Co-owner EPGSC)
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